Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Theology: Faculty Publications and Other Works

Faculty Publications and Other Works by
Department

2-2015

What Christians Need No Longer Defend: The Political Stakes of
Considering Antinomianism as Central to the Practice and History
of Theology
Colby Dickinson
Loyola University Chicago, cdickinson1@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/theology_facpubs
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
Dickinson, Colby. What Christians Need No Longer Defend: The Political Stakes of Considering
Antinomianism as Central to the Practice and History of Theology. Crisis and Critique, 2, 1: 115-149, 2015.
Retrieved from Loyola eCommons, Theology: Faculty Publications and Other Works,

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department
at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theology: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an
authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
© Colby Dickinson, 2015.

What Christians need no
longer defend: The political stakes of considering
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Abstract:
Through a brief history of antinomian thought within the modern
period, and the inspection of two contemporary responses to the
‘antinomian impulse’, I refocus the antinomian debate as being,
not necessarily a heretical endeavor, but rather a dialectic between
history and memory, structure and experience. Rather than portray
antinomianism as a threat to the system which needs to be removed,
perhaps we can learn to perceive it as a ‘weak messianic force’ moving
through all constituted (religious) identities, not, then, as the end of
‘Christianity’ as an organized religion, but its original proclamation, ever
in need of greater reformation.
Keywords:
antinomianism, heresy, Michel Foucault, Martin Heidegger,
Giorgio Agamben, Reinhard Hütter

Introduction
There are a number of ways in which heresy has been labeled over
the years. One of the more popular versions is that of ‘antinomianism,’
which has reappeared throughout the centuries since the Reformation
with an increased and intriguing frequency. It has crept up again and
again as a major, defining political force of reform and has sparked
some of the fiercest theological debates the western world has ever
known. My thesis in this essay is that we often misunderstand what the
‘antinomian impulse’ is really about, how it actually plays an essential
role in giving shape to the Christian faith. I will contend that unless
we can learn to appreciate this ‘antinomian impulse’ for what it is—an
inherent and constituent part of identity itself—we will repeatedly run
the risk of de-emphasizing one of the most significant internal dynamics
of a political theological discourse.
I will explore, first, an all-too-brief history of antinomian thought
within the modern period, from the Reformation to the present day, in
the hope that such a rereading will offer a foundation from which to view
what is really at stake in the oft-recurring antinomian impulses I will later
pick up and analyze. Second, I will utilize the insights of both Michel
Foucault and Martin Heidegger to help us ascertain why both theology
and philosophy are central disciplines needed to comprehend the stakes
of any recurring antinomian controversy. In particular, I want to refocus
the antinomian debate as being not so much a heretical endeavor, but
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What Christians need no longer defend...

C
R
I
S
I
S
&
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1

rather a practical exercise that takes place as a dialectic between history
and memory, or structure and experience. Finally, I will point to sites
within both western theology and philosophy in order to try to isolate
and identify contemporary antinomian impulses within two more recent
positions taken with respect to it, in their more or less ‘conservative’
and ‘liberal’ guises, while trying to understand the significance of
antinomianism for the practice of political theology today.
In all of this, the conclusion I am gesturing toward, though
perhaps not here arriving at completely, emphasizes a new way
of relating to antinomianism, and to heresy itself—a perspective
willing to embrace its (doctrinally) radical ‘other’ in order to gain a
better understanding of itself. What I am sketching is certainly a
hermeneutical, dialectical position through and through. What I am
claiming as well is that this repositioning of antinomian thought as what
lies at the heart of theological history is in fact a political issue above all
else, one that helps us to see why the consequences of this debate are
not only heavily political, legal and ethical, but also philosophical in that
they reveal latent core dynamics underneath the constitution of identity
itself. It has not been a surprise to me, then, that so many philosophers
have recently been attracted to the terrain of political theology, since it
is precisely on these intersecting grounds that these issues have come
most clearly to light. My belief is that such an inclusive position as I try
to advance here will be a significant aid to theological and philosophical
practice.
A brief history of modern ‘antinomian’ theologies
A curiously recurrent feature of antinomianism within the history
of modern Christianity became noticeably prominent when one of Martin
Luther’s fellow theologians, Johann Agricola, appeared to mistake
Luther’s opposed stance to the Catholic Church’s hierarchy and rules,
as well as his firm dependence upon scripture alone, to mean that all
true Christians should turn away from the rule of law entirely. In this
first modern ‘Antinomian controversy’—to be followed century upon
century by other such controversies within the Church—Agricola and
Luther went head-to-head in a series of disputations all designed to
demonstrate, from Luther’s standpoint, the actual necessity of the law
for social order, and its therefore immutable and inevitable presence in
our world. These were points he was certainly not willing to concede,
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not if his movement of reform was to have any real political force.1 Law,
it would seem, is not something entirely replaceable by grace; it is
something merely dis-placed, subject to certain temporal qualifications,
such as the political ‘office’ one must also at times fill. For Luther,
there is grace for the believer, but there must also be the sword for the
‘unbelieving’ masses.
As Reinhard Hütter has recently pointed out, Luther’s response to
Agricola and the other antinomians was intended to promote a genuine,
Christian sense of freedom, one wherein the law and the Gospel might
work together in order to defeat sin. 2 Since we are fallen creatures, the
narrative goes, we must rely upon both the law and the Gospel in order to
receive God’s unfolding plan of salvation for us. The law, or the ‘sword,’
in Luther’s parlance, may not be absolutely necessary for Christians,
but it is necessary for the ‘unbelievers’ and the average Christian’s
relationship to them. Christians, Luther advised, should consequently
feel no qualms about being involved in the governing of the state, even if
that means fulfilling the duties of the ‘hangman.’3 Though Hütter, whose
analysis of Luther on this point I will address in more detail in the final
section, does not note the significance of this link between the necessity
for the law and the Christian’s role in society—one that is complicit at
certain points with justified violent actions and exclusions—we would
do well, at least, to draw attention to how the connection between
Luther’s propensity to maintain order through violent means and his
stress on the law is not simply a passing coincidence.
To some, Luther’s approach to the necessity of law was in
fact a capitulation to his impatient desire for reform and his tendency
toward the violent means needed, in his eyes, to attain it—an account
altogether missing from Hütter’s more purely ‘theological’ descriptions
of Luther’s notion of freedom taken up by Hütter in conjunction with
natural law. The critique I am suggesting is essentially the assessment
offered by the Catholic theologian Yves Congar in his survey of the true
and false reforms both present within the Church, a project which finds
him, for more than one reason, evaluating Erasmus more favorably than
Luther. In Congar’s eyes,

1

Luther 2008.

2

Hütter 2001, 142.

3

Luther 1962, 374.

117

What Christians need no longer defend...

C
R
I
S
I
S
&
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1

What is striking about the reformers who went into schism is their
radicalism. Luther himself was violent and irritable. He knew this about
himself, but he thought that it was helping his mission and that without
it he would not have achieved the work he had to do. That is not only
because he would not have dared to do it, but because too moderate an
approach, like that of Erasmus, would fail to achieve anything effective.4
In other words, to have any traction as politically ‘effective’,
Luther’s position had to be one that worked with the law (or state, in this
instance) and which could not be characterized as antinomian, even
though he might have appeared to some, in his heavy critiques of Roman
hierarchies, canon law and religious regulations, to be promoting such
an agenda.
Despite the fact that Agricola eventually rescinded his own
antinomian position, the original impetus that drove Luther to vigorously
condemn the antinomian viewpoint as a misreading of Christ’s mission
entirely, and which was part of his own quest to distinguish between
the true and the false Church,5 began to accumulate a historical
currency that did not fade over time, but actually became a routinely
utilized concept invoked in order to vilify or slander those Christians
who strayed too far from an ‘orthodox’ acceptance of some level of law
as functional within both society and the church. There are, no doubt,
reasons of contested authority behind such demonstrable tensions
(Luther vs. the Catholic hierarchy of his day, as only one such example),
but these tensions, we should note, are often portrayed as theologically
secondary to the larger doctrinal claims made by both sides—a perhaps
misplaced priority that I am here contesting.
What I would like to draw our attention to, at this point, is the
implicit manner in which the various charges of antinomianism that
spring from the Reformation’s political challenge to Catholic authority
became henceforth insolubly connected to those very same political
struggles that typify contesting political theologies within the Church.
What was really being offered as a response to the challenges of
the Reformation to the Catholic hierarchy, I am suggesting, was the
Reformation’s own internal challenge to itself, embodied in Agricola’s
challenge to Luther—a further, ongoing critique of all ecclesial

4

Congar 2011, 324.

5

See Edwards 1975, 156-179.
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structures and authorities—the quest to locate and live out a grace
apart from all law. By identifying this perpetual Reformation for what it
truly is, we might begin to understand anew why antinomianism became,
and still becomes in many ways, a type of religious, and yet also always,
political movement which “had haunted the respectable magisterial
Reformation from its earliest days.”6
Manifesting itself throughout the centuries following the
Reformation in a variety of guises, from the call to perfection, to an
effort to embrace an experience of Christ beyond all religious structures,
for example, charges of antinomian tendencies or its explicitly embodied
position were anything but few and far between. In many ways, this
fundamental accusation of theological heresy often carried with it the
subtle underpinnings of a genuinely antinomian sentiment—something
we would do well to investigate much further than I am able to sketch
here within the long history of modern theology.
As the Church historian and chronicler of Christian doctrine
Jaroslav Pelikan has pointed out, even John Wesley, the eventual
founder of Methodism, accused Nicolaus Zinzendorf, the once Moravian
bishop, of being antinomian due to his call toward ‘perfectionism’
combined with his ecumenical zeal in advocating the love of Christ
beyond any steadfast institutional affiliations—the real, structural,
authoritative critique that may have won him the title of antinomian.
What is revealing in Wesley’s accusation—and this is the point that
Pelikan rightly draws our attention to—is that Wesley himself critiqued
such ‘antinomian’ stances while maintaining a fervent tendency himself
toward moral perfectionism, an embodied tension that, in reality,
mirrored the Bible’s paradoxical treatment of the subject, for, as Pelikan
observed, “no one born of God commits sin (1 John 3.9),” and yet there
is “another law” within us “making us captive to the law of sin (Romans
7.23).”7
Providing us with mounting evidence that the charge of
antinomianism was often a political charge made within the sphere of
a scriptural or doctrinal point of undecidability, Wesley’s struggle to
articulate the nature of sin in relation to ecclesial structures was more
than paralleled by the ‘Antinomian Controversy’ of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony some years earlier. Within this early American colony, the
6

MacCulloch 2009, 653.

7
Pelikan, 1989, 148. For a more detailed account of Wesley’s views on antinomian thought,
see Gunter 1989.
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charge of antinomianism was actually centered on specific challenges
made by individuals within the settlement to a collective sense of
religious authority, embodied, mainly, in certain cries for a more fluid
sense of identity and less doctrinal rigidity.8 Colonists such as John
Cotton advocated a ‘free grace theology’ that seemed to other, more
conservative members, to be a deviation from the rule of the colony and
an assault upon its values and governing norms. Here, the conclusions
drawn by some of the ‘antinomian’ participants such as Cotton were
merely that society should be more tolerant of those who diverged from
normative (religious) identities, in many ways, the real issue that brought
about the desires for and charges of antinomianism. With this general
tendency of antinomian thought in mind, we witness this particular
movement’s propensity toward ecumenical undertakings, such as in
Rhode Island where the persecuted Anne Hutchinson—the main figure
in this particular controversy besides Cotton—sought refuge under the
guidance of a man who was tolerant of all religions, Roger Williams.9
What such cases demonstrate is that antinomianism, in large
measure as perceived throughout the 17th Century, was understood as
an almost entirely polemical construct, that which was synonymous
with whatever “provoked fears of authority undermined.”10 Though
the doctrinal issues with its ‘adherents’ were often framed as being
involved with—once again as is typical within the Christian tradition—
the theological (or perhaps more accurately, theoretical) tension between
grace and works, the political implications of such tensions were where
the real issues were more often to be found.
What is interesting to consider on this point, and what I am
trying to center this essay on, is the manner in which antinomianism, or
simply a desire to be free of certain rigid structures within Christendom,
doctrine or perhaps even religion itself, in reality appears as a position
determined within very specific historical and contextual political
configurations that are in ever greater need of being comprehended as
political challenges to rival authorities. That is, I am trying to establish
antinomianism as revolutionary or reform-oriented movements arising
from within a given normative framework. These are movements,
8

Breen 2001, 55.

9
See MacCulloch 2009, 722-723. For more on the context of antinomianism in the early
English-American Puritan colonial scene, see also Stoever 1978; Winship 2002; as well as, in an English context, Cooper 2001; and Huehns 1951.
10
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moreover, that occur with some frequency within Christian theology,
whether we label them as fundamentally antinomian impulses or
not. Such a reworking of the standard theological definition of
antinomianism11 might enable us, therefore, to discern why the
opposition to antinomianism—a movement characteristically ascribed
in the Nineteenth Century, for example, to certain groups of Reformers,
particularly Calvinists, who sought justification by faith alone—was
itself often fervent, something even John Henry Newman admired in
one’s theological position.12
We might pause to consider as well, and as would later become
pronounced in a Danish context, the Lutheran theologian Søren
Kierkegaard’s efforts to become contemporary with Christ (contra
history, contra Hegel) through faith alone, which, ultimately, became an
essential feature of his critique of the structures of Christendom that
grounded Europe in his day. It was as if, for Kierkegaard, to mount such
a large scale attack upon the seductive allegiance of Church and state,
and its ‘rule’ of accepting all citizens as automatically Christian, he
was required to restore Luther’s simplified vision of a faith that moved
beyond certain authoritative structures of faith.13 As such, and though
he may not have been labeled as an antinomian during his time14, his
theological position, I would claim, reflected the same fundamental
essence of protest as earlier antinomians—something that will occur
again and again in other theologian’s efforts as we will see. Indeed, the
very notion that one would be able to ‘suspend’ ethical normativity at all,
as he famously claimed in his reading of Abraham’s near sacrifice of his
son Isaac, calls to mind just such a possibility.15
11
From the late Nineteenth Century’s Century Dictionary, here quoted in the ‘Introduction by
the Editor’ to Adams 1894), 12-13: the Antinomian is
[…] one who maintains that Christians are freed from the moral law, as set forth in the Old Testament, by the new
dispensation of grace as set forth in the gospel; an opponent of legalism in morals. Antinomianism has existed in
three forms: in the early church, as a species of Gnosticism, in the doctrine that sin is an incident of the body, and
that a regenerate soul cannot sin; later, in the Reformation, as a reaction against the doctrine of good works in the
Roman Catholic Church, in the antagonistic doctrine that man is saved by faith alone, regardless of his obedience
to or disobedience of the moral law as a rule of life; finally, as a phase of extreme Calvinism, in English Puritan
theology, in the doctrine that the sins of the elect are so transferred to Christ that they become his transgressions,
and cease to be the transgressions of the actual sinner.
12

Newman 1994, 26.

13

See, among other writings, Kierkegaard 1968.

14
I will, however, note here how Paul Martens has referred to Kierkegaard’s ‘Lutheran and
antinomian roots,’ in Martens 2010, 94.
15
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This same impulse to suspend the mechanisms of normativity
(i.e. law, structure, institution) was present, I would also argue, when
the Lutheran pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer sought to oppose the National
Socialist movement in his Germany of the early Twentieth Century.
He too strove to detach his faith in Christ from the structures of
institutionalized Christianity, offering instead both a strong critique of
those Christians who hope to receive grace from some form of legalistic
thinking (“cheap grace”16) and his eventual hope in a “religionless”
Christianity whose shape and contours he could not quite yet make
out, but which he believed to be essential to the liberation of the human
being from the worldly, political confines that held it.17 It is little surprise
that his critique of religion was paralleled by those of both Karl Barth
and Simone Weil, two thinkers whose own experiences of the early
Twentieth Century in Europe were also marked by the rise of institutional
authorities, both political and ecclesial, that gave them cause to rethink
their relationships with religion and Church. My point here is not to
suggest that these authors were all antinomian, but to stress that
their theologies bore traces of this anti-structural, anti-institutional
impulse that is hard to disentangle from ‘antinomian’ thought in general,
whatever such a thing, in reality, actually is.18
In a sense, what these writers, among others, have been
gravitating toward, I am claiming, is the original Lutheran intuition taken
to its inevitable conclusion by its internal (read or mis-read as based
in the Reformation) antinomian impulses, which were really, in many
ways, the original Pauline vision of a faith in Christ that de-stabilizes
but does not entirely do away with the institutionalized structures of the
religious body out of which these desires spring. For Paul, of course,
and we would do well to recall this here, the desire to be apart from the
law was one that rendered all normative identities as void (e.g. Galatians
3:28), but which also allowed Paul, for one, to live within such normative
cultural and religious divisions ‘as if’ they were not (1 Corinthians
16

Bonhoeffer 2003.

17

See Bonhoeffer 2010.

18
One can also perhaps see something similar in those many persons today who claim to be
‘spiritual but not religious’, and who are looking for a way to find harmony with the ‘sacred’ while breaking free of the ‘old’ trappings of what is often perceived as mere religious authority. Such formed sentiments speak immediately—that is, without mediation, as Luther might once have put it—to many people
who are searching for an alternate way to transcend their situation, and whose hopes are captured in
the title of Diana Butler Bass’ more recent, and popular book Christianity After Religion: The End of the
Church and the Birth of a New Spiritual Awakening. Bass 2012.
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7:17-24). In many ways, this tension is still one that we are trying to
comprehend and live out today in theological, political and philosophical
terms, though we often fail to do just that; it is a project committed to
the difficult, but necessary task of living “[…] a love that accomplishes
what the law cannot: justice that endures for each and all.”19 This is
a point to which I will return in a moment when I look at Heidegger’s
reading of the foundational claims of Christianity.
What these modern and even Pauline examples suggest to us is
that the same ‘antinomian’ impulse that once ignited the righteous vigor
of Johann Agricola was probably something latent within Luther’s own
objections to the Roman Catholic Church of his time, but which was,
for Luther himself, something that necessarily needed to be tempered
with structure and law in order for the Reformation to have any traction
as an institutional movement in its own right. This would explain,
on the one hand, why Luther had to resist such impulses, yet, on the
other, why his own reforming tendencies were potentially mistaken as
antinomian, why the antinomian impulse still refuses to go away and
yet why it also cannot be embodied as a free-standing ecclesiastical
structure. In this case, it would seem as if Hannah Arendt’s maxim that
the real trick with a revolutionary movement is finding the right institution
in which to place it could be here reread in its antinomian version:
the real trick with an antinomian movement is realizing that there is
no institution in which to place it, because it already exists within every
institution. 20 If this strikes us as revealing the heart of deconstructive
thought and its forever spectral messianism, I would only suggest that
this is no coincidence at all, and that Derrida’s reluctance to take on any
permanent label, including that of the Jew or the Christian, resides in
such an understanding of the resonance between antinomian thought
and deconstructivist thought. 21
To illustrate the depths to which contemporary thought has been
interwoven with antinomianism, I want to turn in the next section to the
treatment of the topic in the works of both Michel Foucault and Martin
Heidegger. Though my analysis will be frustratingly brief, what I hope to
evidence is the resonance which both thinkers had with antinomianism,
and how such a placement of their thought within the history I have
19

Jennings 2013, 214.

20

See the conclusions drawn in Arendt 1963.

21

See, among others, Jennings 2005.

123

What Christians need no longer defend...

C
R
I
S
I
S
&
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
V
O
L.
2
I
S
S
U
E
#1

already sketched above might further illuminate the contours of
antinomian thinking within the West.
On Foucault, Heidegger, historicity and the potential
uniqueness of Christianity
Perhaps one way to try to understand the position of those
who feel inclined to defend an orthodox vision of the faith against
its antinomian or nihilist threats is to reflect upon the ways in which
their own efforts are more than simply mirrored by general national
and military defenses of society. They, in fact, rest upon the same
premises, ones that often go undisclosed as substantially the same in
their foundational principles. It might prove very helpful in this respect
to look to the analysis offered in Michel Foucault’s 1975-1976 lectures,
titled as “Society Must Be Defended,” for it is in these lectures on the
nature of power in society that Foucault was able to isolate a number of
significant principles that undergird the defense of society: authority,
law, antagonism and war, among others. 22 His analysis of these general,
but foundational terms, all of which are similarly functional within
the analysis of antinomianism in the present essay, quickly leads us
to confront the major dynamics of the Reformation with an ear tuned
toward how such interactions continue to shape the fields of politics,
theology and philosophy today.
The doctrine of faith, as the Reformers soon discovered, and as
Foucault places under evaluation in this context, was directly rooted in
their relationship to the sole authority of the Bible. The principle of sola
scriptura functioned thereby at times as much as a political ideology as
it was a religious belief in revelation. As Foucault reminds us, “[…] it
must not be forgotten that, at least from the second half of the Middle
Ages onward, the Bible was the great form for the articulation of the
religious, moral, and political protests against the power of kings and
the despotism of the church […];” as such, he continued, “The Bible
was the weapon of poverty and insurrection; it was the world that made
men rise up against the law and against glory, against the unjust law
of kings and beautiful glory of the Church.”23 What the sole authority
of the biblical text offered its believers was an apparently unmediated
access to the divine that circumvented the hierarchical authority of an

22

Foucault 2003.

23

Ibid., 71.
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institutionalized world, politically and ecclesiastically, what has also
motivated, as we have already seen, a good deal of its ‘antinomian’
flavor.
With the Reformation, as it were, a new way of recording history
was conceived, one more capable of utilizing ambiguous historical
accounts in order to provide a ‘counter-history’ to the more or less
‘official’ history as written by those in power, a counter-history that
would often appear in its new spectral form as an antinomian impulse,
as I have been contending throughout. Christianity, in Foucault’s
estimation, began to realize (again, hence its re-formation) its potential
to move counter to the currents of history and to resist those worldly
powers that governed historically, though it was also, at times,
complicit with certain political powers in order to achieve its own global
hegemony, something, I have already noted, that also pervaded Luther’s
own stance in relation to political force and use of the ‘sword.’
Foucault, therefore, contrasts a form of history that merely
sustains the rituals of sovereign power with a form of history that
undoes such schemes of power within recorded history, what is for
him part of the legacy of Christianity—whether actualized or not within
history—and especially as it is seized upon by the Protestant Reformers.
This, as I have already described, is what motivates the ‘antinomian’
impulse nearly entirely:
Historical discourse of the Rome type pacifies society, justifies
power, and founds the order […] that constitutes the social body. In
contrast, the discourse I am telling you about, and which is deployed in
the late sixteenth century, and which can be described as a biblical-style
historical discourse, tears society apart and speaks of legitimate rights
solely in order to declare war on laws. 24
What Foucault makes clear, though he does not invoke the
term ‘antinomianism’ directly as a movement per se or by name, is
the struggle (‘war’) against law that typifies political revolutionary
movements, and which is inherently part of the Christian message of
grace (‘contra’ law) even if it is latent or only spectral at times (i.e. as
an antinomian impulse only, and hence my preference for this term). In
the end, whether we call such phenomena antinomian or not, what we
are assessing here is the presence of internal tensions that threaten to
24

125

Ibid., 73.
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deconstruct specific institutionalized and politicized forms which are
rooted somewhere in the event of Christ and which are permanently
bound up with Christianity itself.
Though I am arguing that this counter-historical impulse runs
much deeper than Foucault’s genealogical analysis of the Protestant
Reformation, he does touch upon the core dynamic that motivates and
defines the antinomian, counter-historical protest against the structures
(‘laws’) that be. Underscoring his major thesis within this series of
lectures, he affirms how “History gave us the idea that we are at war;
and we wage war through history.”25 Antinomianism, it would seem,
is simply one side of this apparently perpetual war taking place within
history, for the representation of history. Since there is no ‘nature,
order, or peace’ at the ‘origins’ of the historical record, there is only a
mass of ambiguity that must be debated, and in, more or less, explicitly
political terms.
What Foucault was pointing toward through his genealogy
of a political protest against governing authority dependent upon its
relationship to scripture alone, I am arguing, is what Martin Heidegger
had also already been exploring many years prior to Foucault in his
lectures on The Phenomenology of Religious Life, lectures which shed
much light on the project of illuminating the influence of Christian
thought upon the early stages of Heidegger’s work as well. 26 What
I want to suggest—and this will help illuminate why I am turning
to Heidegger—is that the counter-historical impulse found within
antinomian thought is the same impulse that generated Christianity’s
originary impulse in relation to the Law of Judaism, and is what, in a
theoretical sense, initiated a ‘revolutionary’ break from Judaic Law that
could not yet sever itself entirely from (religious) structured forms if it
was to exist as a religion in its own right throughout history.
I realize, of course, that this claim is a difficult one to prove,
as the form of Christianity that has been passed down through the
centuries is not a permanently antinomian one. By definition, such
a thing would not even be possible to identify as a structural form.
That is, purely antinomian messianic movements have a tendency to
die out very quickly unless they reinscribe themselves back within an
institutionalized, normative framework—the compromise that both
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Luther and the earliest Christians, among others, had to make as well.
Institutionalization (or representation itself then) is, in many ways, the
zero level of hermeneutics that is necessary for religious identity to be
conceived at all. 27
It is also a difficult claim to establish in light of Christianity’s
long-standing hostility toward Judaism as well as Heidegger’s own
anti-Semitic statements. Yet Heidegger’s lectures on the uniqueness
of Christianity in relation to history and historicity are directly relevant
to the point I am trying to make, for it is in these lectures that he
demonstrates how antinomianism is not a deviation from the Christian
norm, but rather a recurring symptom of unjust representations of
the Christ event within a more normative form of Christianity. What
Heidegger advances in this context is an analysis of Christ’s critical
stance taken toward all those structures that characterize our world—a
form of antinomianism in philosophical terms par excellence, and,
consequently, well worth our attention, even if Heidegger himself was
not able to digest the full consequences of this message in relation to
his own views on Judaism.
Christopher Rickey has already, I believe, correctly identified this
tendency in Heidegger’s thought as a Lutheran-inspired antinomian
impulse that lay underneath Heidegger’s larger (theo)political project,
and as that which motivated a good deal of ‘postmodern’ thought
that came after it, presumably figures such as Derrida and Agamben
included. 28 Rather than draw only a sharp critique of Heidegger’s
alleged antinomianism, as Rickey tends toward, I would like to draw
out some of these antinomian tendencies in Heidegger’s thought in
order to demonstrate how this particular Christian-Lutheran strand of
reasoning might actually be part of a larger hermeneutics of religious

25

Ibid., 172.

27
The impetus for such a balanced approach, for example, can be found in the work of David
Novak, who, in an article addressing the fundamental basis of antinomian thought, declared that Christians should cease labelling Jews as legalists, and Jews, for their part, should cease to call Christians
antinomian. As he put it, “At the key point of human action, both of these extremes substitute man for
God by replacing the divine with the human. The legalist errs by placing the kingdom of God in human
hands; the antinomian errs by denying there is any kingdom at all in his or her radical individualism.
The Rabbis saw antinomianism at the heart of the rejection of God’s authority. The antinomian lives in
an ultimately absurd universe […].” Novak 2000, 280. His solution is to point out the manner in which
both Jews and Christians adhere to the law of God, though they may differ on what exactly such an
adherence in reality resembles.

26

See, for a thorough exposition of Heidegger’s early Christian influence, Kisiel 1993.
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representation in general, though one still severely misunderstood. 29
For example, as Heidegger bluntly puts it within these lectures:
“Christian worldview: [this is] actually a contradiction! It does not
arise from a complex of a historical kind, like the Christian.”30 The
Christian, from this point of view, somehow eludes being a historical
figure akin to all other historical figures, and this, according to
Heidegger, is for a particular reason: the Christian relation to form itself
is one that cautions the Christian to not be conformed to this world
at all (e.g. Romans 12.2).31 History involves itself in a certain action
of ‘worldization’ (Verweltlichung) as an attempt to secure oneself by
‘worldly’ means within this world.32 Yet, as Heidegger outlines in his
lectures,
There is no security for Christian life; the constant insecurity
is also characteristic for what is fundamentally significant in factical
life. The uncertainty is not coincidental; rather it is necessary. This
necessity is not a logical one, nor is it of natural necessity. In order to
see this clearly, one must reflect on one’s own life and its enactment.33
It is the Christian identity, then, which finds itself continuously
‘insecure’ within history, insecure with history itself. At the very moment
in which Christianity declares itself to be a religion wherein the divine
is particularly wedded to the historical in an essential fashion (i.e.
the Incarnation), it simultaneously also critiques one’s relation to any
historical act of ‘worldization’, and to history itself as a consequence.
There is no single, monolithic History within the Christian narrative,
or for the Christian per se—a fact that Christians, throughout the
centuries, have often misunderstood in their attempts to sacralize a
particular historical or social narrative. We might even suggest that

29
There is no doubt that any reading of Heidegger’s take on anything like antinomianism will
have to be read alongside his anti-Semitic remarks, which, with the publication of his Schwarzen Hefte,
will only become a more prominent issue in upcoming years. My reading of his antinomianism at present, however, is one attempting to be in line with Jacob Taubes’ reading of the difference between Judaism and Christianity that clearly resonates with certain aspects of Heidegger’s formulation of Christianity.
See Taubes 2010.
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Heidegger himself, in his alignment with National Socialism, at some
points succumbed to this temptation.34
What can be sensed underlying this bold, but renewing,
hypothesis on the Christian’s relation to history is the radical
presence of Christ (or of God more generally), that promises to allow
one to transcend history and that is the experience of God beyond
all authoritative norms. This is the presence of God (parousia) that
comports one toward God, according to Heidegger, and which causes
a turning away from the worldly (or, the idolatrous), prompting one to
not be concerned about the specifics of Christ’s return, but rather to be
concerned with one’s awakening as a form of sobriety.35 Heidegger’s
rereading of the Christian’s identity is an existential redefining of the
Christian in such a way that this identity can be seen to permeate any
situation in which one finds oneself prior to the proclamation of the
Gospels within any normative construction of identity, yet completely
transformed—continuously transformed—from within. In this sense,
and echoing Pauline thought rather heavily, nothing changes in one’s
identity, though everything, surely, also changes radically.
What is doubly intriguing on this point are Heidegger’s
suggestions made regarding Christianity’s permanent unsettling
of historical identity, in that he reads such a position as one yet
constitutive of identity as such, as foundational of such identifying
structural formations. This understanding is what will allow him, within
these same lectures, to conceive of the non-philosophical foundations
of philosophy—the point we must return to again and again if we are
really to critique the exclusively rational grounds of modern thought
(what Hütter, as much as John Henry Newman, had really been trying
to do, and which I am also trying to do, though in a slightly different
manner).
In ways that might be said to foreshadow Deleuze and Guattari’s
portrayal of the non-philosophical within the philosophical,36 Heidegger
suggests that “The historical is the phenomenon that for us should
open up an access to the self-understanding of philosophy,” though
Christianity seems to be somehow outside this particular philosophical
understanding, though, also, at the same time, at its foundations, even

30

Heidegger 2004, 87.

31

Ibid., 85-86.

34

See Slavoj Žižek’s comments on Heidegger and National Socialism in Žižek 1999, 9-66.

32

Ibid., 23.

35

Ibid., 74.

33

Ibid., 73.

36

Deleuze and Guattari 1996.
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granting it a foundation.37 It would seem, based on his conclusion to the
lectures, that it is Christianity which best enables one to gain some
distance from the processes of worldization—to become attuned to a
radical comportment to the world that re-determines one’s lived sense
of temporality, but which is yet, somehow, also characteristic of a fuller
experience of temporality. This is what it means, he suggests, when
he states that “Christian experience lives time itself,” just as the nonphilosophical lives the philosophical as one facet of the experience
of human existence, though not exclusively, as that which is solely
constituent of human experience.38
We arrive hence at this most curious conclusion to Heidegger’s
lectures, something which needs to be rethought in relation to
contemporary philosophical ‘returns to religion’ within certain
continental circles:
Real philosophy of religion arises not from preconceived concepts
of philosophy and religion. Rather, the possibility of its philosophical
understanding arises out of a certain religiosity—for us, the Christian
religiosity. Why exactly the Christian religiosity lies in the focus of
our study, that is a difficult question; it is answerable only through the
solution of the problem of the historical connections. The task is to
gain a real and original relationship to history, which is to be explicated
from out of our own historical situation and facticity. At issue is what
the sense of history can signify for us, so that the ‘objectivity’ of the
historical ‘in itself’ disappears. History exists only from out of a present.
Only thus can the possibility of a philosophy of religion be begun.39
Or, from the perspective I have been taking in this article, why
should we return to the issue of antinomianism again? My answer, pace
Heidegger, is now hopefully clear: such a tension between structure
and experience, as stereotypically represented by the tension between
Judaism’s Law and Christianity’s antinomianism (its ‘grace,’ as it were),
is what is inherent to identity itself—and therefore not just Christian or
just Jewish identity. This lesson, which Heidegger himself, we must
note, did not fully subscribe to ‘all the way down’ to its core, was what
37

Heidegger 2004, 24.

38

Ibid., 57.

39

Ibid., 89.
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must be repeated as constitutive of all identities (religious, political or
otherwise), not dismissed or critiqued out of existence altogether.
Christianity, for its part, certainly found itself asserting an
identity that emphasized the antinomian impulse as it arises from out
of an event that appears as an ever ‘pure present’, the faith that exceeds
any nomos which exists as an already given structure. The structural
forms of Christianity that arose shortly after Jesus’ death certainly
emphasized it, though whether or not this was Jesus’ intention—as he
himself seemed content to present his message fully within the Jewish
traditions—is another question, and one very well worth pursuing.40
Historically, however, as a phenomenon of the evolution of identity
within its own right, Christianity itself, as a reform movement internal
to Judaism, and so which in a sense also never ceases being a Jewish
movement, seems to capture the antinomian impulse perfectly, and is,
consequently, ‘doomed’ to repeat it over and again as essential and
constitutive of its own identity.41
Perhaps a more conducive perspective for the practice of
theology would be to admit the necessity for structural antinomian
impulses within both Jewish and Christian faiths and not to shy away
from their existence. Rather, we might learn to read these symptoms
of structural unease as moments for the potential liberation of, and
increased justice rendered toward, subjects who will always be

40
Perhaps this is why the Freudian hypothesis takes on such significance in Gershom Scholem’s and Jacob Taubes’ readings of it. Freud’s hypothesis, for better or worse, was that Judaism did
not, or could not, emphasize its own internal pluralistic elements—i.e. its alleged Egyptian origins, according to Freud, though this hypothesis should serve as only an almost metaphorical example of what
was really at stake here. See Taubes 2003. See also Freud 1939. What I am suggesting here is that
this ability to avow and disavow one’s foundations, which Freud essentially claims, is akin to John Caputo’s development of a ‘religion without religion’—a privilege not accorded the more tradition-adhering
sides of any institution or religion—perhaps provides us in some measure with a direct view of the true
nature and function of antinomian thought, that which seemingly continues to motivate each ‘new’ burst
of Christian messianic fervor, from Paul to Luther, and from Kierkegaard to Caputo (whom I will address
directly in a moment).
41
Though, certainly in light of the present publication of Heidegger’s Schwarze Hefte (‘Black
Notebooks’), much remains to be said on Heidegger’s stance vis-à-vis Judaism and its apparent
‘worldlessness’ or ‘deworlding of the world’ which is bound up with his own difficult ‘ontological-historical
antisemitism’, I am here suggesting that there is perhaps a shared tension within Heidegger’s own work
between both Christians and Jews with regard to their identity formation in relation to their being-inthe-world. Though Heidegger himself does not in the context of his lectures on Christianity advance a
parallel between these two religions, and in fact exploits Christianity in favor of his reading of Judaism
in other places, I yet believe that his work does point out the inherent structural tensions within Judaism
which he himself was not able to further theorize with regard to the historical religions of Judaism and
Christianity. My thesis, then, is that both Christianity and Judaism engage in a certain ‘worldlessness’
that must be valued as a necessary part of identity formation in general. On the anti-Semitism within the
notebooks, see Gordon 2014.
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‘normatively’ defined so to speak, and at times even unjustly oppressed.
Accordingly, as much as this struggle is about the tensions that
constitute identity—the tensions of the self permanently caught
between an institutionalized structure and a private experience—it is
also a struggle that contains a hope for more justice to be done to the
particular individuals who continuously stand before us, asking us to
recognize and even love them.42
Though I have spent a good deal of space narrating a brief
history of antinomian tendencies since the Reformation, I want, in what
follows, to demonstrate how the specter of antinomianism—for it is
little more than a permanent specter that haunts traditional ecclesial
and theological structures and discourses—is still a major, and often
undisclosed, problematic within theological and philosophical reflection
and praxis.43 The current situation is as if the antinomian impulse were
more formalized so to speak; charges of its heresy are certainly less
frequent, more vague, though the desire to present a love, an encounter,
an ethics, or a person, all beyond the structures of the law (thus altering
our coordinates of identity in general) becomes that much more forceful
in a modern context. To illustrate this point, I will next move on to
examine two impasses within contemporary thought that both turn, in
their more ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ versions alike, on their desires to
resolve the ‘antinomian problem’.

Two contemporary responses to antinomianism
The first antinomian position in contemporary thought:
An impasse
As with both Paul and Luther, these readings of antinomianism
do not carefully distinguish between religious, cultural or political
antinomianism, but, rather, implicitly perceive that all of these forms
go together in an undisclosed sense. This is the case, as well,
and, perhaps, more directly so, with the first antinomian position in
contemporary thought that I wish here to take up. It is the one we could
more or less label the ‘conservative’ position, one characterized by its
defensive reaction to what appears, to it, as an antinomian threat made
42

On this dialectic between structure and experience, see Malabou 2010, 81.

43
For an astute analysis of these tensions as they are played out in the field of theological
discourse, see Taylor 2011.
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in relation to the given normative structures of both the Christian faith
and (a western, Christianized) society as a whole.
In a relatively recent article in First Things, R.R. Reno embodies
the contours of this approach through his insistence upon the necessity,
for the genuine expression of faith, of eradicating such antinomian
flourishes that lead, not just the Church or theology, but society as a
whole, down the primrose path to its moral demise. He summarizes
the stakes in critical proximity to liberal Protestant trends: ‘Modern
Protestantism does not have a monopoly on antinomianism. Various
versions of postmodern cultural theory rest on similar assumptions and
also lead to condemnations of law and endorsements of spontaneity.”44
Indeed, even ‘spontaneity’ itself is seemingly condemned as an aberrant
product of the deviation from social and religious normativity.
What I want to pay attention to here, and ultimately insofar as it
supports the overall thesis of this essay, is how Reno detects this same
antinomian impulse as present even within theological movements that
do not recognize such a label, and as he detects them as inherently part
of the dynamic that drives an ongoing Protestant Reformation of all
structures. In this way, I would suggest, he is correctly attentive to the
real issues underlying antinomian thought, though, perhaps, wrong in
his diagnosis of the larger problematic, as we will see. Reno is, however,
careful to outline exactly how such a situation arose in our western
world today, as he suggests that
Luther failed to put an end to the antinomian temptation, and today
it seems irresistible. Influential mid-twentieth-century theologians such
as Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich translated the Reformation doctrine
of justification by faith alone into an abstract principle that they used to
critique and deconstruct all forms of religious authority.45
His invective against Bultmann, Tillich, and even the more
contemporary philosopher Gianni Vattimo (though a host of other
‘postmodern’ thinkers linger underneath his highly critical words),
would seem to be centered on defending the ‘normativity’ of tradition
against its disintegration at the hands of ‘postmodern’ theorists, for

44

Reno 2012, 34.

45

Ibid., 34.
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whom “It’s a sin to be any-kind-of-normative.”46 It is also, presumably,
his job then to uphold such normative measures—which would also
include the denunciation, in the same article, of transgendered persons
as ‘disordered’—all in the defense of a (structurally) genuine faith.
Rather than respond directly to Reno’s claims—something I do
not feel would advance the argument very far, for, in his schema, you
are either a Christian connected to the genuine faith or a postmodern,
antinomian, and potential nihilist cast into the darkness of a lawless
world—I want to turn to a more academic exposition of the problem from
another First Things contributor, Reinhard Hütter, a theologian who also
senses perils latent within the fragmentation of our world today.47
For Hütter, though sharing a good deal in common on this
score with Reno, the legacy of the ‘Protestant antinomian captivity’
that still drifts throughout Christianity today and which has potentially
major ‘ecumenical dimensions’ for the Church, is one that needs to be
disclosed for what it is and pulled up at the root.48 In his estimation,
the seduction of modernity’s embrace of the subject’s autonomy has
led humanity down the path toward a particular form of ‘freedom’ that
ends up more closely resembling nihilism in that it neglects the reality
that “True moral autonomy consists in the free submission under and
obedience to God’s moral law.”49 Hence, the real underlying problem
with Christianity today, but also with society if one frames it in such a
way, is that its true antinomian flavor is one that neglects the normativity
of the moral law within, and the subject suffers as a result.
Hütter’s essential claim is that humanity has sought freedom
“only in a very incipient and fundamentally incomplete way,” through
its restriction of natural law to reason alone, and this would serve to
explain, in due measure, why his account of modernity and freedom
must run through a usual list of suspects: Kant, Fichte, and Nietzsche.
By framing his critique as a condemnation of such divergent viewpoints
as each ‘founder’ of modernity presents us with, his analysis is, in some
sense, postured in order to introduce his interpretations of Aquinas and
John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor as those dei ex machina which
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serve to rescue natural law as an innate moral (eternal) law.50 As such,
the law, whose “paradigmatic example” is Christ, is now capable of
performing “a liminal service that protects genuine freedom from being
reinterpreted as license and thus from losing the good by itself defining
the good and evil and consequently losing itself.”51
Though Hütter does not take up an account of conscience as a
form of natural law or even natural religious sentiment—as John Henry
Newman might otherwise have put it, and thus as a natural religious
element within all of humanity, whether one recognizes God in it or
not—he does drive home the fundamental point of his response to
antinomian initiatives within modern Protestant thought, offering his
critique with a series of suggestive points addressed directly to his
question of whether “genuine human freedom as constituted in Christ
can be gravely endangered, deeply distorted, and ultimately destroyed
by particular kinds of acts”—though he does not name these acts
as such. What he does pronounce, however, is sentence upon this
antinomian captivity of Protestantism via his charge that it subverts true
freedom and enslaves the soul to a lawless and ignorant wandering from
God:
Might it be that contemporary Protestant theology lacks the very
conceptuality even to recognize this question as a challenge, since it
is bereft of a theology of the law that would complement and shape the
inflated and rarely reflected use of the notion of ‘freedom?’ In short,
could it be that much of contemporary Protestantism is unable even to
acknowledge that there is a challenge because of an antinomianism that
has become so thoroughly taken for granted that any awareness—not to
mention critical self-awareness—of the tacit antinomian commitments,
deeply engrained in most of contemporary Protestantism, has been
lost? 52
The threat of antinomianism, by this count, is really double,
because not only is it all pervasive within contemporary Protestantism,
but, moreover, it continues to act unimpeded and unrecognized for
what it is. Hence, there is much practical deviance to be discerned

46

Ibid.

47

See, for example, Hütter 2011, 37-41.

50

See also his extended discussion of Aquinas in relation to the moral law in Hütter 2012.
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Hütter 2001, 122.
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Hütter 2001, 135.
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in the nature of the Protestant Church today behind Hütter’s claim
of an “antinomian fallacy of a Protestantism without the Law”—the
fundamentally flawed notion which even Luther himself sought to
overcome and which, presumably, has infiltrated every ecclesial
structure at some level.
Hütter’s argument is repeatedly insistent upon the fact that
neither Aquinas, Luther, Melanchthon nor Calvin reject the rule of
natural law, and that a recovery of such an innate moral law can actually
reactivate a cultural and even political landscape, one that ‘political
liberalism’ fails to achieve through its indebtedness to certain forms
of ‘antinomian Protestantism.’53 Yet, what Hütter’s account lacks, I
would argue, is its own critical self-awareness of the manner in which
certain justifications of natural law are inherently and inextricably
linked to forms of sovereign power. Just who determines what is and
what is not ‘natural?’ On what grounds and through what contrasts
with other ‘unnatural’ things? Lest we forget, it was the difficulty of
determining any ‘natural’ theology concretely in history that once led
Jürgen Moltmann to define it as “[…] in actual truth theologia viatorum,
an anticipation of the promised future in history as a result of obedient
thinking,” and not as an originary foundational principle.54
Moltmann’s subsequent call for a form of ‘permanent
iconoclasm,’ as a sort of ongoing Reformation within the Church in tune
with his ‘theology of hope’, may strike many as a somewhat ‘antinomian’
principle in-itself.55 What it offers us, however, is an opportunity to not
get bogged down in quests for more originary ‘natural’ foundations that
do not necessarily exist (or, at least, could never be clearly identified)
in reality. Though Hütter’s claims are carefully distinguished from
modern forms of sovereign (‘autonomous’) subjectivity—something
which he routinely condemns—they do at times resemble a pre-modern,
almost medieval, notion of ‘sovereign unification’ of nature in that they
assume the uncontested pre-existence of a normative, natural law.
In this sense, Hütter’s claims, as with Reno’s, I am arguing, share in
the modern quest to purify (reason or religion, it matters little which)

53

Ibid., 147.
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Moltmann 1993a, 90.
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Moltmann 1993b, 87.
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in order to attain legitimacy and political privilege.56 This implicit
embrace of a pre-modern worldview invokes my hesitation to embrace
this particular response to antinomianism in contemporary thought,
for it is this response which seems to lack, what I would call, a fuller
political theological—or, in Hütter’s formulation, critically self-aware—
account of those implicit or explicit theological positions that actually are
utilized in order to re-inscribe certain theological claims within a nexus
of (sovereign) political power, ones well invested in trying to achieve
political privilege through their ‘naturalization’ of certain privileged
institutions and persons (e.g. defending heterosexual marriage, strict
male/female boundaries, etc.). This position, in the end, results in a
conservative ‘impasse’ that pits the truth of ‘true freedom’ versus the
antinomian nihilist, and does nothing to consider the ways in which
issues of justice are bound up within such tensions.
What I wish to do next in this section, therefore, is to develop
an alternate account of antinomian thought that does not perceive it
as an obstacle to be overcome by a more genuine theological account
of freedom; that is, one that does not seek to resuscitate a pre-modern
form of political power, but, rather, an account that tries to embrace
‘antinomianism’ as the only way to sustain truly critical thought—what
will, perhaps only in appearance, be the ‘liberal’ alternative. Beyond
this, however, what I hope to demonstrate is that even this account, one
that approaches the subject from an altogether opposed angle, still
at times runs the risk of missing the larger, hermeneutical framework
within which antinomian thought operates, and, therefore, might also
fail to overcome the same impasse that the first option encountered,
though from the other side as it were. By demonstrating this second
position alongside the first, however, I am ultimately aiming to try to
gain access to another perspective on antinomianism altogether, one
focused on the political theological elements always already at work within
any given theological account of the law, and which are often used to
justify political power and/or violent means to access (sovereign) power,
though, as I hope to show, these means need not be utilized as such. In
order to do this, however, I must first examine what has become, from
the other ‘liberal’ side of things, the second antinomian position in
56
See the critique of such purification temptations in Latour 1993. One could suggest that such
a quest is particularly surprising, given that the essay is dedicated to Stanley Hauerwas, an advocate of
Christian pacifism, and yet seems uncritically to advocate an adherence to social norms which may be
at odds with Hauerwas’ position (e.g. the just war traditions put forth by each of the theologians Hütter
wishes himself to champion).
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contemporary thought that, I believe, does not end in an impasse, but
actually opens us up to further options beyond what appears to be a
nihilistic end to all law.

The second antinomian position in contemporary thought:
Permanent reform
The temptation within certain theological voices today—Reno
and Hütter in this instance, but also many others who strive to ‘defend’
theology from both modern and postmodern claims—is to either
severely critique or outright dismiss postmodern philosophical theories
as hell-bent on undermining the very foundations of Christian freedom
as posited in the eternal, intractable moral law within us. A typical
‘liberal’ response to such ‘conservative’ and defensive posturing might
then entail a radical openness to the antinomian impulse—something
akin to the notorious ‘play of differences’ that postmodern thinkers such
as Jacques Derrida appeared to many to revel in.
For quite some time now, commentators on the work of the
philosopher Giorgio Agamben have likewise struggled with his various
attempts to ‘end’ the violence of representation and his insistence that
there is a presentation beyond representation that is truly possible, if
only we could learn to return ourselves properly to the ‘pure potentiality’
that resides within us.57 His remarks in this particular vein of thought
show more than a passing affinity with those reformers who would
advocate an end to all law. His numerous comments upon the existence
of the law and his desire to see the ‘transgression of the law as the only
true fulfilment of the law’ have brought him into the company of other
potential antinomian, messianic figures. His repeated references to
Sabbatai Zevi—the once heralded potential Jewish Messiah whose
transgression of the Law, and eventual conversion to Islam—and others
who appear to enjoy certain antinomian impulses, does little to avert
charges of antinomianism in his thought.58
For Agamben, who has claimed to be out-deconstructing the
master deconstructivist Derrida, the law exists as something to be
cancelled out, or to be put to new, unintended uses that lessen its force,

57

I expand upon these themes a great deal more in Dickinson 2011.

58
On the life and antinomian tendencies of Sabbatai Zevi, see Scholem 1973. See also
Taubes’ commentary on Scholem and Sabbatai Zevi in Taubes 2003.
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as a child plays with an old passport.59 Such gestures are captured,
in his opinion, perfectly through the Jewish figure of the Messiah, the
one person who was to undo the normative force of the law altogether.60
Referencing the incorporation of the messianic concept within Judaism,
Christianity and Shiite Islam alike, Agamben demonstrates how each of
these traditions understands the Messiah as signifying
[…] the fulfillment and the complete consummation of the Law.
In monotheism, messianism thus constitutes not simply one category
of religious experience among others but rather the limit concept of
religious experience in general, the point in which religious experience
passes beyond itself and calls itself into question insofar as it is law
(hence the messianic aporias concerning the Law that are expressed in
both Paul’s Epistle to the Romans and the Sabbatian doctrine according
to which the fulfillment of the Torah is its transgression).61
Critical questions on this point that are put to Agamben seem to
circulate around the same area: is he trying to access a place beyond the
law? Does he want anarchy to rule? How are we, practically speaking,
to take him seriously in this world of contracts and property disputes,
etc.? Or, in theological terms, should there be no Church anymore? 62
What is often mistaken by a variety of commentators upon
Agamben’s work who see in his theoretical vision the dismantling of
all law,63 is that Agamben, despite his being fully immersed within the
‘postmodern’ milieu that should condemn him to the outer reaches of
nihilistic despair, is actually searching for a way to restore a certain
balance to the function of law within our world, to develop a form of
‘perfect antinomianism’ that works from within the existence of law—as,
then, inherent to the existence of the law itself in order to develop a new
relationship to law. Thanos Zartaloudis, for his part, has described this
active perspective in Agamben’s work as exactly a form of antinomian
thought:
59

See the conclusions reached in Agamben 1993.

60

This theme is pursued throughout Agamben 2005.

61

Agamben 1998, 56. See also, the parallel formulation in Agamben 2000, 134-135.

62
2013.

Questions such as these are pursued at length, for example, in the essays gathered in Frost

63

See, for example, the critique levied in Mills 2008.
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Perfect antinomianism is a force internal to the actuality of the
law […] though not internal to the law, which inverses the latter’s
effectiveness; it does not preserve the law as it is nor destroy it, nor
does it create a new law to replace the old law, but it instead restores law
to the sphere of pure means, and renders it free to common use.64
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The incessant tension between structural forms and an experience
beyond those forms—what I have elsewhere looked at in this context as
a permanent tension between canonical forms and messianic forces65 —
does not inevitably lead to a complete (antinomian) rupture with tradition,
but rather develops a hermeneutics, albeit a radicalized one, in response
to the tension itself. This, I suggest, is what we hear from Agamben’s
own lips as he contemplates the existence of the Church in 2009,
something which might have appeared as a shock to those who took him
as an antinomian:

C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E

By placing origin and end in contact with one another, this force
endlessly fulfils and ends time. Let us call this force Law or State,
dedicated as it is to economy, which is to say, dedicated as it is to
the indefinite—and indeed infinite—governance of the world. As for
the second force, let us call it messiah, or Church; its economy is the
economy of salvation, and by this token is essentially completed. The
only way that a community can form and last is if these poles are present
and a dialectical tension between them prevails.66
Rather than espouse a radicalized, ‘one sided’ antinomian
position, he attempts here, and contrary to those many voices that have
sought to present his work as yet another endless deconstructivist play
in differences, to preserve the tension between a structure, or law, and
its antinomian, messianic force that serves to undo it, precisely in order
to maintain the (normative) identity of a community. Though many of
his detractors might read his comments on antinomianism otherwise, I
think it more fruitful to perceive this act of ‘deconstruction’ as one that,
in the end, upholds our need for social structures and representations,
while also finding a space for the ‘pure critique’ of such structures to
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be pursued, which is, as Derrida himself might have put it, the only
authentic way for a genuine justice to ever prevail.67
What we might also gain from such a reading of Agamben’s work
is that such a dynamic was, indeed, present in the work of Derrida, who
was, perhaps, more inclined to preserve normative, canonical structures
than his detractors often realized—a fundamental part of his project
to remain ever open to the horizon of justice potentially always before
us.68 John Caputo, who might be taken as something of an exemplar
here in refining this antinomian position—and this is what gets him
in trouble with theologians such as John Milbank and presumably a
good many more—follows Derrida’s lead in describing what he calls a
‘religion without religion’, what could easily be construed as a form of
contemporary antinomian thought, though which may have more going
on within it in terms of identity establishment than might be noticed at
first glance.69
Caputo, maintaining Derrida’s insistence that all thought
seemingly boils down to the tensions between a given structure (of
thought, of politics, of ethics, of religion, etc.) and its inherent desires
from within to ‘deconstruct’ the structure (i.e. its ‘autoimmunity’ he
would say70 ), has attempted to write a theology of the event that plays
precisely upon the structural ambivalence of all identifications in order to
point the way toward a ‘radical, creative, and even sacred anarchy’ that
promises only to both shake our identities to their core and thoroughly
transform the structures that be within religion itself—though, for him,
this is a task done in response to Christianity, or, more specifically, his
own Catholic roots.71 It is also, however, and from the start, a political
project all the way down, as he recognizes that such a reading of
religious structures is bound to upset those looking to defend them.
Caputo’s version of theology, likely to Hütter’s chagrin, “[…]
exists in fragments and asides and apostrophes within confessional

67

See, among numerous other references to justice in Derrida’s later work, Derrida 1994.

68
I would point to a curious interview with Derrida that is often neglected by his critics in which
he explicitly, and repeatedly, defends such normative measures as canonical representations and literary canons in general. See Derrida 1992.
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Zartaloudis 2010, 300.

69

See Caputo 1997.
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Dickinson 2013.
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See his numerous references to ‘autoimmunity’ in Derrida 2004.
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Agamben 2012, 34-35.

71

Caputo 2013, 261.
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theology,”72 It is not a monolithic entity and it does not, as such, need
anyone to defend it. Contrary to the position of those more ‘orthodox’
theologians looking to label him as heretical, he feels, such a theology
“[…] is testified to every time confessional theologians come under
attack as heretics or atheists, whenever they touch a nerve in the powers
that be that know their power is being put at risk.”73 Fully recognizing
the dilemma he is attempting to address (and in this way sounding a bit
like Luther once did), Caputo is not seeking to do away with structure
completely—a point well worth underscoring at the moment, for it may
offer us a chance to perceive this second position as less of an impasse
and more of an opportunity in the end. As he exclaims, the event of
being contemporary with Christ, or God (much like Kierkegaard earlier)
demands that we continuously reform the structures that be—social,
political, religious, or otherwise—though we cannot do away with them
altogether: “[…] the creedal structure is weakened in favor of the event
while the creedal faith is not simply jettisoned, so one remains in the
creedal structure, as if not.”74 Repeating Paul’s dictum that we remain
in our current social standing ‘as if’ it were not what actually defines us,
Caputo is attempting, I would suggest, to illuminate antinomian thought
as a central and dynamic constitutive feature within (religious) identity in
general.
From Caputo’s perspective, and as a sort of answer to the
apparent aporia we witnessed a moment ago in Agamben’s work, the
solution to this ‘impasse’ is not to perceive deconstructionism, or
postmodernism for that matter, or antinomianism—whatever these
things truly are or are not—as a problem to be overcome, but simply
as part of a larger, hermeneutical process that, in its entire scope, is
seldom comprehended for what it truly is. What I am contending is that
we can neither simply dismiss nor fully embrace antinomian thought.
Rather, we must learn to utilize it as a symptom of structural injustices
that must be listened to as prime indicators for where genuine reform
is needed. Though this is a form of ‘radical hermeneutics’, it is not
simply a nihilistic or absurd antinomianism: it is dialectical through and
through.
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Conclusions
In some ways, we might perceive antinomianism as the most
ancient of heresies, or even blasphemies,75 Christianity’s foundational
heresy in relation to Judaism’s Law, the reformer’s heresy in protest
against the Catholic Church, or as the postmodern challenge to any
given normative structure. In this sense, the antinomian challenge
is thoroughly political first and foremost, and should be understood
as such. As Benjamin Kaplan has pointed out was the case in early
modern Europe, heresy and sedition, practically-speaking, went handin-hand; toleration, by contrast, was an embarrassing, illegitimate
position to hold.76 Antinomianism does not diverge from this reading
of heresy, but, rather, outlines itself, as read through its history, as
a significant feature of it. We might thereby see antinomianism as
the heresy that cannot be structurally concretized, and, as such, that
which will never be wholly uprooted and removed. For many, however,
antinomianism simply remains the specter in the shadows that is feared
but rarely understood.
Accusations of antinomian heresy are for this reason often flung
out from within such fearful and consequently distorted perspectives.
Yet, what are we really to make of these heretical accusations? For, as
is typically the case in history, “The spectre of heresy among the people
was a disturbing symbol of the unease aroused in the privileged by those
on whom their privilege rested so heavily.”77 Heresy, as R.I. Moore has
recently put it, is an ‘old weapon’ that does “not necessarily describe
the beliefs of its targets more accurately.”78 Moreover, as he makes
clear, those who generally combatted heresy as the chosen social and
religious war most effective for propagating the faith, often, in reality,
become “[…] adept at convincing themselves and each other that
resistance to their authority, and to their noble and sincerely held ideal
of Christian unity under the leadership of the church universal, was the
work of the devil. The measure of their achievement is that so many still
believe it.”79
The fear of rampant social and personal moral nihilism among
75

Such is where Leonard W. Levy, for example, places antinomianism in Levy 1981.
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Kaplan 2007, 124, 143.
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Ibid., 62.
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Moore 2012, 330.
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the mass of individuals within western society is, in many ways, I would
suggest, simply the fear of one’s own internal antinomian impulses,
which is really a fear of oneself, the power, anger and misguided
authority that one is capable of wielding. It is also an insecurity with
not-knowing where one narrative will cease to exist and another will take
over, the crossing of boundaries where real reformation does occur,
but which is ‘good for the system’ as well. One can never really embody
an antinomian position as it has, by definition, no institutional form.
Normative, institutionalized forms are yet all that we live our lives by,
in the sense that they provide a shared sense of cultural intelligibility.
We often fear, however, the trouble which antinomian thoughts inspire,
and, consequently, have little comprehension of what such impulses
might do to our reconstruction of normative measures. Within such
misdirected historical quests for Christian ‘unity,’ and especially in light
of Christian anti-Semitic positions, the politics of exclusion become
manifestly more important than doctrinal divergences, as friends and
enemies alike are made upon such borders.
The question to ask at this point is: to what degree does a
given tradition allow itself to listen to competing histories and to
discern between them as to the merit of each (by their own strengths)?
Or, to what degree does a tradition seek to present itself not as an
inherently plural discourse in and of itself, but as a monolithic structure
undivided from within by its own internal tensions? The strength of
a hermeneutical viewpoint on this score would be that it is capable of
acknowledging its own fluctuations, pluralities and histories within its
self-perspective. That is, the more a given canonical representation
allows its own repressed elements to be heard, the more justice it does
to them, thus promoting a sense of a ‘happy memory.’80 As such, this
is to envision multiple histories within any given tradition as already
engaged in a political struggle to articulate themselves, and to affirm
that this is how things should be, rather than trying to achieve a singular,
static representation of History. Such a schema means being attentive
to the ‘weak messianic forces’ working within a given tradition, often
mistaken as antinomian thoughts, but waiting to be seen at the precise
moment when they are in need of being seen—therefore also as
‘dangerous memories’ in Johann Baptist Metz’s sense of the term.81
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Maybe what we are in need of is what Shaul Magid, in the context
of exploring certain strands of Jewish antinomianism—which share
a certain affinity with Agamben’s reading of Sabbati Zevi—refers to
as a ‘dialectic of heresy,’ or “the very thing that enables a tradition to
survive by expanding the boundaries of legitimacy in order to push the
tradition towards its redemptive end.”82 What Magid identifies, and here
merely bears repeating, is a task “[…] to legitimate and even sanctify
the tension of living simultaneously inside and outside the law,” or that
which would see antinomianism as an ally rather than an enemy in the
never-ending quest for justice.83
My efforts in this essay are not aimed at repeating the errors
perhaps latent in Heidegger’s alleged antinomianism—something no
doubt bound up with his anti-Jewish positions and that might be said to
have been motivated by his effacing of the Hebraic tradition altogether
from his thought84 —but in returning, you might say, to Christianity
as a form of Judaism itself, as that which arises from within its Hebraic
heritage, and which, if it is to be true to itself, must in some sense
return to its roots time and again. What we are trying to move toward
is a theological and philosophical reading of history and the forces that
work from within it to undo it, not in order to identify and defuse their
apparent threat, but to see them for what they can be for us, their value
and also their beauty. Rather than portray antinomianism as a threat
to the system which needs to be removed, we can see it as a ‘weak
messianic force’ moving through all constituted (religious) identities,
not as the end of ‘Christianity’ as an organized religion, but its ‘original’
proclamation, ever in need of greater reformation, and, indeed, not even
limited to Christianity either, though this has been my focal point in
this essay. Yet we might also label this the true ‘poverty’ of Christian
thought, its weakness that is foolishness to the strength of this world,
but is, in actuality, also the strength of its ‘crucified’ God.
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